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INTRODUCTION

In 1960, the automobile industry in Mexico consisted of a dozen small
firms that assembled vehicles from imported kits. By 1970, there was
substantial automobile manufacture in Mexico: 60 percent of each
vehicle sold in Mexico was produced there. By 1980, Mexico had become a significant exporter of automotive parts, particularly to the
United States. Cars "made in the U.S." had a fair chance of containing
Mexican-built engines, springs, windshields, or transmissions, and automotive exports had become a point of friction between the U.S. and
Mexican governments. Moreover, during these years, the automobile
industry was the engine for a new surge of industrial growth in the
Mexican economy. This book explores this transformation at three
levels:
First, it aims to provide a historical account of the growth of automobile manufacturing in Mexico, a significant element in the industrialization of the country and an important chapter in the history of
the internationalization of the automobile industry.
Second, it aims to understand bargaining and dependency relations
between transnational corporations (TNCS) and the state in developing
countries. The coming of automobile manufacture to Mexico has been
accompanied by a steadily increasing domination by transnational
firms—Ford, General Motors, Chrysler, Volkswagen, Nissan, Renault,
and American Motors. Nevertheless, the development of automobile
manufacture would not have occurred without the continuous exertions of the Mexican state. The twenty-year history of the automobile
industry in Mexico thus provides an unusually rich case for examining
bargaining between states and TNCS in the overall context of the dependency of a developing country.
Third, most generally and for us most importantly, it seeks to exemplify a historical-structural method, demonstrating the ability of this
approach to address the fundamental issues of social-science inquiry.
The approach, simply stated, follows Marx's maxim: "Men make their
own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past."1
1
Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Robert C. Tucker,
ed., The Marx-Engeb Reader (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 437.
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However much this may seem like common sense, it is decidedly not
the established position in the social sciences, particularly in the United
States. All too often, theorists a priori assume either that there are
certain historical laws or social structures that determine and thus
explain human action, or that individuals or groups exercising their
free will can voluntaristically re-create themselves or society. Our intention is to use a historical-structural method that is neither deterministic nor voluntaristic. We will explore what possibilities for human
action are open or closed at a particular time within given social structures; we will try to explain the interests of actors and their power to
create change within these historical limits; and we will look at how
actions taken over time (i.e., human history) change or maintain social
structures, which themselves open possibilities for, as well as limit,
future action.
The structures with which we are most concerned are those of capitalism as a world system. These are the structures that define dependency in less-developed countries (LDCS). Proceeding from our historical-structural approach, we see these as constricting but not
determining the chances for development. There are possibilities for
action—in this case, by the state—to make development happen. But
whether this development can be rapid and whether its fruits can be
equitably shared are among the questions for our analysis.
BARGAINING AND DEPENDENCY

Three episodes of bargaining between the Mexican state and the transnational automobile firms were particularly important in moving the
automobile industry in Mexico from simple assembly to domestic manufacture to exports. These three bargaining conflicts and the changes
they brought about are the substance of our narrative. The central
actors were the Mexican government and the transnational automobile
firms, but Mexican entrepreneurs and the home-country governments
of the TNCs played important supporting roles. Though vital to the
development of the industry, labor in Mexico was never involved in
shaping industrial policy toward the automobile sector. Bargaining
among the key actors moved the industry forward from assembly to
domestic manufacture to exports, but this bargaining took place within
structures that were both national and international. The political economy of Mexico has been continually shaped by its dependent relationships with the world capitalist system, and the Mexican automobile
industry by its dependent relationships with the world auto industry.
4
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These complex structures delimited the alternatives and shaped the
interests of the actors and their power to choose among them.
Our analysis proceeds, though not uncritically, within the broad
perspective of dependency theory. The theory of modernization of
the 1950s and 1960s sought to explain underdevelopment by viewing
some countries as simply starting later and proceeding more slowly
than others along the path to development because of an adherence
to traditional values and institutions.2 In this perspective, all countries
follow essentially the same route to "modernity." By contrast, the dependency perspective argues that the earlier development of some
countries significantly alters the terms and chances of development of
others. "Underdevelopment" in Latin America, Africa, and Asia (the
"periphery") is not an inherent condition but rather a consequence of
the earlier "development" of Europe and North America (the "center")
and of the integration of the peripheral countries into a capitalist world
economy on terms which are generally disadvantageous to them. In
this perspective, Mexico is not simply "behind," nor can it simply follow
in the footsteps of the United States. Rather, relationships with the
industrialized countries hinder the development of those following
after them. The complex and often subtle ways that such relationships
impede development have been the primary concern of the dependencia
perspective.
Central to this perspective is capitalism viewed as a world system.
The intellectual origins of the dependencia framework were rooted in
the concern of Latin American scholars for the domestic consequences
of imperialism. The world capitalist system, the dependency approach
argues, is "characterized by a functional division of labor" between the
center and the periphery.
Countries of the center are industrially advanced and viewed as
capable of developing dynamically in accordance with their internal needs; they are the main beneficiaries of global links. The
periphery has a less autonomous type of development, conditioned
2
For explications of the modernization approach, see Gabriel A. Almond and James
S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
I960); Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); and Cyril E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966). Important critiques of the modernization
theory include Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," Comparative
Studies in Society and History 9 (1967):292-346; Joseph R. Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change," American Journal of Sociology
72 (1967):351-362; and Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
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by the requirements of the center's expansion. Dependency analysis attempts to understand, and evaluate, the developmental implications of peripheral capitalism.3
Simply stated, dependency is a situation "in which the rate and direction of accumulation are externally conditioned."4 Dependency is
not inconsistent with development: there may be significant economic
growth, as there has been in Mexico over the past half-century. It is
rather that actors and processes outside the country undergoing development are principally responsible for setting the opportunities for
and the limits to development. Nor does external conditioning mean
that the benefits of development accrue only to those outside the country. The dependency perspective is concerned with the internal analogies of external structures and processes. Relationships of dependency serve to benefit a domestic elite that draws wealth and power from
its privileged position within the linkages that tie a developing country
to the world capitalist system.
This external conditioning is largely defined by a complex web of
international relationships between center and periphery, involving
trade, finance, and investment, which have varied in their relative
3
Gary Gereffi, The Pharmaceutical Industry and Dependency in the Third World (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 7-8.
4
Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, Slate, and Local Capital
in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 27. Compare the more elaborate
definition of Theotonio dos Santos: "By dependence we mean a situation in which the
economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another
economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two
or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence
when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and be self-sustaining while other
countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which
can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development." Theotonio
dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," American Economic Review 60 (1970):236.
Other important treatments of dependencia are: Celso Furtado, Economic Development of
Latin America: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Cuban Revolution (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1970); Heho Jaguaribe, Economic and Political Development: A Theoretical
Approach and a Brazilian Case Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Frank
Bonilla and Robert Girlin, eds., Structures of Dependency (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1973), Suzanne Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin
American Underdevelopment," in K. T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges, eds., Readings in
U.S. Imperialism (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971), pp. 155-181; Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1967); James T. Petras, Latin America: From Dependence to
Revolution (New York: John Wiley, 1973); Osvaldo Sunkel, "Big Business and 'Dependencia'," Foreign Affairs 50 (1972):517-531; and Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo
Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1979).
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importance but which have tended to reinforce one another. Since
World War II, investments by transnational corporations have been
particularly critical in shaping situations of dependency. Whereas direct foreign investment was once confined primarily to mining and
agriculture, and to activities closely connected with these, such as railroads, direct foreign investment in manufacturing has been dominant
in recent decades. These investments were triggered in part by import
substitution policies of LDCS that were seeking to induce domestic manufacturing and thus to lessen trade dependency (the export of primary
products to pay for imports of manufactured goods), but they stemmed
as well from the postwar international expansion of transnational corporations based in the U.S., Europe, and J a p a n .
While the modernization approach has tended to see TNCS as beneficent agents of change bringing capital, technology, and management skills to LDCS, the dependency approach has inclined toward a
m o r e critical view, arguing that investments by TNCS have posed a threat
to domestic capital accumulation and that manufacturing industries in
LDCS have been shaped more in response to world market conditions
and the global strategies of TNCS than in response to the needs of the
populations of developing countries. O n e important concern of the
dependency approach with transnational corporations has to d o with
their consequences for distribution, TNCS, it is argued, not only impede
national accumulation, but they also foster an inequitable international
distribution of income by shifting capital from developing to developed
countries (through profit repatriation, payments for technology, and
sales of parts and equipment). Further, it is argued that TNCS reinforce
an inequitable distribution of income within developing countries. Important as this concern is, it is not the one on which we will primarily
focus. O u r main interest, rather, lies in the possible distortions of an
LDC'S economy, society, and politics that can follow from the activities
of TNCS. Transnational corporations, it has been argued, are unwilling
to invest in activities that would promote growth and industrialization.
T h e y utilize inappropriate (capital-intensive) technology a n d introduce
inappropriate products into LDCS. Further, they prevent the develo p m e n t of an indigenous economic base, squeezing out local entrep r e n e u r s or pre-empting their entry into the most dynamic sectors of
the economy; and they distort local market structures, visiting u p o n
LDCS the oligopolistic structures and practices of globally organized
industries. Finally, it is claimed, TNCS co-opt local elites or form alliances
with domestic e n t r e p r e n e u r s to block government efforts at regulation,
and they use their influence with home-country governments to keep
host-country governments in line.

7
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These hypothesized distortions will be foremost in our attention as
we examine the consequences of TNC activities during two decades of
development of the automobile industry in Mexico. The nature of these
consequences has depended not only on the actions of the transnational
automobile corporations, however, but also on the actions of the Mexican state. There has been a decided tendency in dependencia analyses
to depict the state as passive and powerless in the face of the TNCS, not
as an actor able or inclined to oppose them in any significant respect.
In this work, we proceed from a different assumption: that in certain
circumstances, the state in developing countries can and will attempt
to alter the behavior of TNCS and the consequences of that behavior.
It may even seek to alter some of the structural aspects of dependency
in which TNCS have a substantial stake. Exploring this assumption requires attention to bargaining between the state and TNCS.
This study seeks to advance the understanding of dependency and
development processes in a number of different ways:
(1) It focuses on a single industry over two decades of growth and
change. Dependency studies that take entire countries as their focus
of analysis tend to sketch the mechanisms of dependency only in very
broad strokes. Studies of single industries can provide a much clearer
understanding of the predicaments faced by specific actors and what
they can and cannot do in them. On the other hand, studies of single
industries within the dependency perspective have largely been restricted to the extractive industries. We focus on a manufacturing industry because this has been the most dynamic sector of foreign investment in recent decades and because the lack of industrialization
was a defining feature of dependency before World War II that many
third-world governments have sought to overcome. Furthermore, the
particular industry examined, automobile manufacture, is one that has
gone through significant changes in its global organization, thus allowing us to follow the consequences of changes in international structure
for actors in Mexico.
(2) It pays particular attention to public policy toward the industry.
Many dependency studies concentrate so much on the structural constraints that define situations of dependency, or presume the state to
be so passive, that they fail to make a serious inquiry into public policy.
The automobile industry in Mexico has been an object of government
policy for the past quarter-century. We want to analyze not only the
constraints imposed by situations of dependency but also the alternatives for action within these constraints and the consequences of
choices made. At least in the Mexican case, this requires an examination
of the making and implementing of public policy.
8
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(3) For related reasons, this study pays particular attention to bargaining between the Mexican state and the transnational automobile
firms. The Mexican state has by no means been able to establish by
fiat whatever policy it chooses. Instead, it has had to negotiate with the
transnational automobile firms. Although there have been a number
of excellent studies of bargaining between third-world governments
and transnational firms, these have not been fully integrated into the
dependency perspective.
(4) It is a case study of the limits of possibility for a state seeking to
overcome dependency while abiding by the norms of global capitalism.
The Mexican government has not attempted to remove Mexico from
the world capitalist system. Rather, it has pursued policies aimed at
providing both growth and increased autonomy for Mexico within that
system, and nowhere has this been more evident than in the automobile
industry. Our study therefore is a kind of test case for the dependency
perspective.
(5) It employs a historical-structural approach that gives equal emphasis
to structures and actions, to limits and possibilities. A historical-structural approach is already embodied in the best examples of the dependency perspective; what we seek now to contribute is a deliberate
and consistent application of this approach to both of our principal
actors, the Mexican state and the transnational automobile corporations.
T H E HISTORICAL-STRUCTURAL APPROACH

Taken together, dependency and bargaining manifest the central
methodological perspective of this book—the historical-structural approach. The dominant approaches in American social science have
tended toward either determination or voluntarism and have thus led
to fundamental distortions of the human condition and subtle betrayals
of the proper aims of social analysis. In contrast, the historical-structural approach holds that human beings are social products, but that
society itself is a product of human actions. In the words of Cardoso
and Faletto, this approach "emphasizes not just the structural conditioning of social life, but also the historical transformation of structures
by conflict, social movements and class struggles."5
The dependency perspective places particular emphasis on structures—-particularly the structures of the world capitalist system—that
"condition" development. These structures, to quote Cardoso and Fa5

Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, p. x.
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letto again, "impose limits on social processes and reiterate established
forms of behavior."6 In the hands of some dependency analysts, this
structural conditioning tends toward a certain determinism; possibilities for significant choice within these structures and for action to
transform structures are denied. We are interested, however, in the
possibilities for change within and against existing structures. Structures condition but do not fully determine; they impose limits but also
shape possibilities. The task for social analysis is to explore, concretely,
the structural limits and the possibilities for action in particular historical situations. Our emphases on state policy and on bargaining are
intended to make explicit these concerns with alternative possibilities
and with the transformation of structures.
Structures shape the interests and power of the actors within them.
Insofar as structures bequeath overwhelming power to some actors or
mold a fundamental convergence of interests among actors, structures
will tend to persist. Efforts to alter them will be ineffectual. However,
structures tend to "generate contradictions and social tensions"7—i.e.,
conflicts of interest—and these set the stage for change. One major
task of this study is to explain the interests of the Mexican state and
the transnational automobile firms, to reach some understanding of
how and why their interests converged at some points and diverged
into conflict at others.
The historical-structural approach to the actors in a set of events
proceeds from three leading ideas: (1) Each actor has interests and
power of its own—the wherewithal to make its own history. (2) The
possibilities for action are limited by the structures in which actors are
enmeshed, and each actor's interests and power are shaped by its position within these structures. (3) These structures are historical products of past human actions and, in certain circumstances, are susceptible to marginal change or transformation by the concerted efforts of
the actors.
For an elaboration of a historical-structural approach applied to
transnational corporations, we turn to industrial-organization theory.
First formulated in the United States and most widely employed in the
study of the U.S. economy, industrial-organization theory has been
used almost exclusively in the analysis of industries within the geographically constrained national market of a developed country. Because our concerns are with a developing country and with transnational corporations, which operate simultaneously in several different
6
7

Ibid., p. xi.
Ibid.
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national markets, several revisions of industrial-organization theory
will be necessary to fit it to our purposes.
The structure most important (though hardly the only one) in shaping the interests and power of the transnational automobile firms in
the Mexican setting is the structure of the industry in which they
compete, both globally and in Mexico. Two aspects of this structure
will be salient in our analysis: (a) the structure of the market, principally
the number of firms in the industry, and (b) the structure of ownership,
principally the extent of domination by transnational firms. These
aspects of the Mexican automobile industry structure were in part the
result of struggle between the state and the TNCS. Once created, they
have been crucial in shaping the behavior of the firms and the performance of the industry in Mexico.
Unlike the case for the transnational firms, there is no single structure which is of pre-eminent importance in shaping the interests and
power of the state or in delimiting its possibilities for action. The
relevant structures are many: they are domestic and international, and
they are political, economic, social, military, and cultural. Moreover,
despite the renaissance of attention to "the state," there is no single
theory of the state to which we can turn for an elaboration of the
historical-structural approach; we have had to fashion our own, drawing on a number of perspectives.
Consistent with the historical-structural approach, we depict the state
as an actor with interests and power of its own—a conception that is
denied, explicitly or implicitly, by a number of current perspectives.
This hardly means the state can act "just as it pleases," nor is it an
insistence on the autonomy of the state. While state action may be
shaped and constrained, for example, by its relationship to the domestic class structure or to the structure of international finance, the
state is nevertheless an actor, capable of formulating its own policies
and of exerting power in an effort to carry them through.
Our approach to the state understands its interests as being "embedded orientations" that have been acquired and institutionalized in the
course of its history as the state has responded to problems and opportunities facing it. The power of the state is set both by internal
characteristics (unity, technical capability) and by its relationship to the
structures around it, particularly the domestic class structure. In the
Mexican situation, it is particularly important to see the active role of
the state in shaping this relationship to domestic classes; it has not
merely been an object that was captured or shaped in the conflict
among them.
The historical-structural approach—this concern with structure and
11
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action, with dependency and bargaining—informs the organization of
this book. Chapters 2 through 4 introduce the major actors and the
structures within which they are enmeshed, and it sets forth in greater
detail the theoretical perspectives that guide our analysis. Chapter 2
provides an overview of the political economy of Mexico, focusing on
the changing character of dependency within the world capitalist system, and lays out our theoretical approach to the Mexican state as an
actor. Chapter 3 does the same for the world automobile industry,
showing Mexico's place within that structure in 1960 and setting forth
our theoretical approach to the transnational automobile corporations.
Chapter 4 elaborates our framework for the analysis of bargaining
between the state and transnational corporations.
Drawing on this foundation, chapters 5 through 10 analyze dependency and bargaining in the automobile industry in Mexico between 1960 and 1980, concentrating on three major episodes. For each,
we will (a) examine the structures that determined the limits and possibilities for action and shaped the interests and power of the actors,
(b) examine the conflict itself and show how its resolution led to change
or continuity in the structure of the automobile industry in Mexico,
and (c) show how this new structure set the stage for the next conflict,
imposing new limitations but opening other possibilities for action.
Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with the 1962 bargaining: the effort
of the Mexican state to create a manufacturing industry in Mexico by
means of an import-substitution policy, the resulting enactment and
implementation of a governmental decree, and the structure of ownership and of the market that resulted. Within these new structures,
there arose a series of problems for the state and for some of the firms,
particularly the Mexican-owned ones. Chapters 7 and 8 deal with a
second major conflict in 1968-1969, growing out of these problems.
The bargaining that took place in this connection led to a decision to
move away from import substitution and toward export promotion as
the basic thrust of policy. The chapters examine the difficulties this
change engendered and the way in which the problems were rendered
more serious by a crisis in the political economy of Mexico in the mid1970s, as well as a series of changes in the structure of the world
automobile industry which had important implications for Mexico and
the transnational corporations. Chapter 9 considers a third bargaining
episode, in 1977, the result of which was a new decree strengthening
export requirements, and chapter 10 treats a variety of problems that
resulted from this Decree.
Chapter 11 draws a number of conclusions about the historical12
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structural approach, the consequences of TNCS for developing countries, and the possibilities for altering these consequences by state action. In a postscript, we provide a brief discussion of a new automotive
policy, promulgated in September 1983, while Mexico was in the midst
of an economic crisis.
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